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INTRODUCTION 
The term fiscal responsibility in financial dictionary is defined as “A balanced 
budget”. That is a budget wherein expenditures during a given period of time equal to 
revenues. The fiscal responsibility also includes a budget in which revenue is greater than 
the expenditures. Fiscal responsibility is achievable and most of the individuals in their 
private life practice fiscal responsibility. At individual level everybody knows that they 
have to live within the budget and usually they do not overspend. Usually overspending 
by individual results in bad crediting rating which one receives from their creditors due to 
non-payments or late payments of installments and thus denies future benefits to the 
person concern.  
Fiscal responsibility at national level implies that a government has a balanced 
budget and has sufficient revenue to pay for its all expenditures. There would be no 
overspending if government had a true balanced budget in each period. The economic 
future of a nation largely depends on the way fiscal responsibility is practiced. There is a 
direct link between budget deficit today and what nation can enjoy in future. Fiscal 
responsibility is crucial for a nation to remain prosperous and stronger in future. Fiscal 
responsibility will also determine what kind of future we are leaving to our children and 
grandchildren for the next 20 years and beyond. If the fiscal responsibility is not 
practiced the government would spend more money than its income and it borrows for 
the difference. If the money borrowed come from domestic savings or from domestic 
lenders the economy will have less money available for capital investment and future 
productivity growth rates and levels would be lower. If on the other hand deficit is 
financed by foreign organisation/country the country will be indebted with growing debt 
to the rest of the world, with growing interest costs which must be served every year. If 
we rely more on foreign sources to finance the resource gap the foreign ownership of our 
resources would grow and so has our dependences on the actions of foreign governments 
and investors.  
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At least for the last two decades poor/weak fiscal responsibility is being practiced 
in Pakistan as the fiscal deficit for these two decades remained more than five percent of 
GDP. The persistent fiscal deficit resulted in the increased debt burden both in terms of 
internal as well as external debt and interest payments. Our growing dependence on the 
action of foreign organisations/countries is manifested from one of the conditions laid by 
IMF on the loan given to Pakistan in 2008; the condition was that the government would 
raise electricity charges during the loan period. Perceiving the poor fiscal responsibility 
practiced by the federal government the then finance minister, Mr. Shaukat Aziz, in his 
budget speech 2001-2002 made a policy commitment by stating that:” government is 
considering promulgation of a fiscal responsibility law that would limit the government’s 
access to borrowing for financing its expenditure”. The policy commitment, made by the 
finance minister, was materialised in the form of “Fiscal Responsibility and Debt 
Management Act-2005. The objective of the paper is to critically evaluate the FRDL 
Act–2005 and also see the extent of implementation of various conditions laid down in 
the act. The paper is organised as follows: Section – I would deal with the History of 
FRDL type law enacted in other countries like India etc. Section – II would deal with the 
Constitutional provision for framing of FRDL. Section – III would deal with the critical 
evaluation of FRDL and the implementation status of various sub-heads of the act. 
Finally the conclusion is drawn on the preceding discussion.  
 
1.  FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) are now popular and many countries have 
enacted FRLs so as to enhance the reliability, certainty, and transparency of fiscal policy. 
Generally FRLs are combination of rules and regulation needed to strengthen fiscal 
transparency and budget management, with numerical ceilings on fiscal deficits and 
public debt to achieve fiscal discipline. The aim of FRLs is to provide a comprehensive 
framework for management of fiscal policy through a single legislation. New Zealand 
was at the forefront to adopt FRL in 1994 with a too much emphasis on transparency 
requirements. After the adoption of FRL by New Zealand it has been implemented in 
several countries in Asia, Europe and in Latin America.  
FRLs are different than stand-alone numerical fiscal rules, which are defined as a 
permanent constraint on fiscal policy through simple numerical limits on budgetary 
aggregates [Kopits and Symansky (1998)]. FRLs can be classified according to several 
characteristics, including the emphasis placed on procedural versus numerical fiscal rules, 
the jurisdictional coverage (e.g. central versus federal government), sanctions, escape 
clauses, and cyclical considerations. 
Since the 1990s many governments made serious efforts to devise such 
mechanisms which would not be used for winning election and retaining public office. 
One of the mechanisms for National governments to prevent these problems was to pass a 
fiscal responsibility law (FRL) which prescribes proper fiscal behaviour for Subnational 
Governments (SNGs), provides guidelines for parameters of SNG fiscal legislation, or 
sets incentives rewards for success or sanctions for failure in following the rules. 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Peru have done so. The countries such as Turkey, 
Poland and Mexico have not adopted fiscal responsibility legislation for subnational but 
they have established fiscal rules or debt limitations for SNGs. At this stage it would be 
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appropriate to briefly discuss FRLs for the countries who have recently adopted these 
laws. The prominent countries are Brazil, India, Argentine and Australia.   
 
Brazil 
“In Brazil’s political opening through mid-1990s, there were two major 
subnational debt crises. Each initial agreement that tried to resolve a crisis actually made 
the next crisis more likely, because they reinforced the perception that the federal 
government would provide debt relief, they provided such relief in the form of 
rescheduling (allowing the stock of debt to keep growing), set ceilings on debt service 
and thus on the effective political cost, bought out (without penalty) the foreign and 
private creditors to the SNGs and left the federal government holding the debt. Thus the 
state politicians suffered minimal consequences for their imprudence and their creditors 
suffered almost none, and so until 1997 the ex-ante constraints written in the rescheduling 
agreements were usually quickly evaded” [Dillinger (1997); Rodden (2003)]. In late 
1990s, this subnational debt crises came to end because of adoption of national 
macroeconomic adjustment programme which not only ended hyperinflation and 
stabilised the economy. During 1997-98 the federal government made debt restructuring 
agreements with 25 states and the objective was to cease unsustainable borrowing. As a 
result of this debt agreement three largest debtor states supported the reforms and formed 
the core of a critical mass of states ready to cooperate in fiscal restraint, making it 
worthwhile for additional states join at the margin of cooperation. Also, the large scale of 
the states’ non-performing debt to the federal government strengthened the resolve of the 
federal Congress to enact the FRL. The federal government negotiated agreements with 
25 states in 1997 and 1998. These agreements were sanctioned by Law 9496 of 
September 1997 to reschedule the states’ debt conditioned on states undertaking fiscal 
reforms and compliance with fiscal targets. The FRL in 2000 codified fiscal adjustment 
programs sanctioned by various resolutions [Alfonso (2002); Dillinger (2002)].   
 
Argentine 
The provinces in Argentine, during, the 1980s had no budget constraint they 
borrowed a lot, and effectively could monetise this debt, contributing to hyperinflation. The 
stabilisation programme in 1991 was centered on the Convertibility Plan, which fixed the 
Argentine exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. During the 1990s a market based strategy was 
followed by the national government mainly for coordinating fiscal discipline between 
provinces: the central government would enforce hard budget constraints ex post and force 
the provinces to pay their debts [Dillinger and Webb (1999)].  By the end of the 1990s, the 
absence of the ex-ante fiscal controls had allowed a number of Argentine provinces to over-
borrow, party fragmentation had narrowed the scope for fiscal compromises, and the 
national government had overcommitted itself by setting floors on transfers, even if national 
revenues fell [Gonzalez, Rosenblatt, and Webb (2004)]. 
At the national level, the budget balance was deteriorating and there were growing 
debt payments, a Fiscal Solvency Law was approved by the Congress in 1999—its first try 
at an FRL. It aimed to and did inspire a third of the provinces to pass their own FRLs. 
During 2001, however, the FRLs virtually stopped working because there was extreme 
mismatch between the fiscal and monetary policies of the national government and 
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furthermore the provincial FRLs do not have enforcement power and most of the 
economically important provinces had not passed them. Only 5 out of 11 provinces that 
imposed a hard budget constraint actually fulfilled their commitment [Braun and Tomassi 
(2004)].  In 2004, Argentina tried anew with a national FRL that applied to the provinces as 
well as the national government and capital federal district. It passed Congress hastily 
[Braun and Gadano (2006); Laudonia (2009)],  and it did not come out of a consensus 
building process with the provinces  nor reflect a solid technical consideration of how the 
provinces might adjust their finances to meet the legal requirements. Although many 
provinces complied with some of the law’s procedural requirements, almost none were 
meeting the quantitative targets even before the onset of the global crisis in 2009. After that 
the quantitative targets were put on hold, which further undermined the credibility of the 
FRL process in Argentina. 
 
India 
The Indian Constitution does not allow the states to borrow from abroad and the 
states are require to obtain permission from central government for domestic borrowing. 
The borrowing by states is allowed by the central government after discussing with states 
on financing state development plans. The constitution provision, to limit the state 
borrowing, could not limit the explosive growth of state debt, the system could not 
stopped fiscal deterioration as indicated by high levels of debt over GSDP ratio in many 
states in the late 1990s. The factors responsible for deterioration in fiscal accounts of 
states in Indian are: increased expenditures on salaries, pensions, retirement benefits, and 
on subsidies, increased borrowing to finance the growing revenue deficit, and growth in 
contingent liabilities related with fiscal support to cooperatives, public sector units, and 
the statutory boards. 
The fiscal reforms adopted by the government, since the early 2000s, has focused 
on to a more flexible, market-linked borrowing regime within sustainable overall 
borrowing limits imposed by the central government and self-imposed state-level deficit 
limits. Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act was enacted by the federal 
government in 2003 which applies to the national government only, but some states had 
also adopted their own FRLs before the enactment of the federal FRL [e.g., Karnataka 
and Punjab in (2002)] and many states have since 2003 adopted FRLs in line with the 
national law. After the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005), FRL has become mandatory 
for all the provinces and the federal government has offered a sizeable incentive to 
provinces for passing their FRL. 
 
Australia 
In Australia, during 1990s there was growing concern that the country do not have 
legislation for fiscal responsibility. The idea of legislation for fiscal responsibility gained 
considerable attention in the 1990s. At the federal level, the Business Council of 
Australia called for legislation requiring a surplus budget on average over the business 
cycle. The federal government adopted the Charter of Budget Honesty Act in 1998 and 
there was improvement in fiscal outcomes. Australia adopted, in the mid 1980s, its first 
fiscal rules which put limits on the growth of expenditure, taxation and budget deficit. 
During the recession in the 1990s the net debt of the country increased more than 20 
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percent of GDP and in fact net debt has never went beyond 20 percent of GDP. The 
combined state and Commonwealth general government net debt had not exceeded 30 
percent of GDP in the 1990s [Simes (2003)]. Some states had adopted fiscal 
responsibility legislation prior to the federal government’s adoption. New South Wales 
passed legislation in 1995 to commit itself and future governments to medium- and long-
term fiscal responsible targets including the elimination of the net debt. Victoria passed 
the Financial Management Act in 1994, which was amended in 2000 through the 
Financial Management (Financial Responsibility) Act, which outlines principles of sound 
financial management, reporting standards and pre-election budget update. Minister must 
produce a pre-election budget update 10 days after the issue of a writ for an election. The 
Act broadly states what the update must contain and the principles upon which it must be 
based. 
 
2.  FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW IN PAKISTAN 
The approval and implementation of Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation 
Act–2005 was meant to provide for elimination of revenue deficit and reduction of public 
debt to a prudent level by effective public debt management. The Federal government has 
completed seven fiscal years since the implementation of FRDL in June 2005. In the 
following paragraphs we will analyse major conditions laid down for sound fiscal and 
debt management.  
 
3.  AN EVALUATION OF FRDL ACT—2005 
The implementation of Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005 was 
the serious effort by the government to create strong institutional mechanism to restore 
fiscal discipline at the level of central government. The other objective was to introduce 
greater transparency in fiscal operations of the central government. In the following 
paragraphs we will evaluate FRDL act-2005.  
According to Act No. VI of 2005 the Federal government shall take all appropriate 
measures to achieve following policy objectives: 
 To eliminate the revenue deficit. 
 To reduce total public debt and maintain it within prudent limits thereof. 
 
Short Title, Extent Commencement of the Act 
The Act may be called Fiscal responsibility and debt limitation Act.2005. 
 It extends to the whole of Pakistan. 
 It shall come into force at once. 
The coverage of the act is whole of the Pakistan which means that the four 
provincial governments, AJK and Northern Areas are required to follow the two policy 
objectives of the FRDL. Here the question is that in the wake of more provincial 
autonomy, more transfer of financial resources to provinces, through NFC award and, 
furthermore, transfer of public related sectors, like health, education and social welfare,  
to provinces, how the federal government can administered its control over provincial 
expenditures and revenues?. The fact is that the act imposes restrictions only on the 
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federal government but the provincial governments are not, practically, in the 
scope/preview of the act. It is therefore imperative that FRDL may also be framed for the 
provincial governments. The federal government has no control over the provincial 
expenditures. It worth to note that the first policy objective is related to revenue deficit 
which is the interplay of revenue and expenditure. 
 The FRDL is silent about the absolute fiscal deficit which otherwise is the 
source of concern for fiscal policy makers. The fiscal deficit is one of the 
important indicators of fiscal imbalances. The government has given top 
priority to contain fiscal deficit in it expenditure management strategy. It 
worth to note that how and why the FDRL act does not consider fiscal 
deficit as a source of concern, therefore, no targets has been set for reduction 
in fiscal deficit.  
 The fiscal deficit is the excess of total expenditure (Current and Development) over 
revenue receipts and grants. If we do not consider fiscal deficit as a source of 
concern but consider revenue deficit as a source of concern this clearly implies that 
we neglect the development needs of the country. The capital 
expenditure/development expenditure contributes to the development process in the 
country. The share of development expenditure in total expenditure is less than 20 
percent which is the manifestation of neglect of development need in FRDL-2005. 
 
4.  ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOUND FISCAL  
AND DEBT MANAGEMENT 
In the following paragraphs we will analyse principle of sound fiscal and 
debt management in seriatim and also the current implementation status of each 
principle.  
 
(a)  Reducing the Revenue Deficit to Nil Not Later Than the Thirtieth June 2008 
and Thereafter Maintaining a Revenue Surplus 
 No specific targets have been set to bring revenue deficit to zero up to 30-6-
2008 and thereafter maintaining a revenue surplus. The act is devoid of any 
strategy/implementation plan to bring revenue deficit to zero. Such as what 
amount of revenue deficit should be reduced each year i.e. say 0.5 percent of 
GDP at the end of each financial year. 
 While formulating the act the possibility that reducing the expenditure and/or 
raising the revenue might have adverse affects on the growth of the country 
keeping in view the prevalent and emerging economic conditions. I.e. the 
possible impact of expenditure reducing/revenue raising strategy on growth of 
the economy has not been fully estimated.   
 As the revenue deficit is the result of expenditure and revenue. The revenue side 
includes both tax and non tax and surcharges of the government. In crease in 
revenue by increasing non-tax revenue requires that public services be 
appropriately priced which may be difficult in the presence of high inflation and 
increasing cost of fuel and electricity.    
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Table 1 
Revenue Deficit as a Percentage of GDP 
 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
Revenue Balance  as % of GDP –3.2 –1.2 –2.4 –3.3 
Source: Debt Policy Statement 2011-12. 
 
 The above table indicates that the revenue deficit is not zero as on 30-06-2008 
and thereafter it is not in surplus. Thus the first condition of FRDL is not met till 
the fiscal year 2010-11. The objective was to fund for consumption from 
government’s own resources and not borrowing. “The existence of a high and 
persistent revenue deficit indicates government’s inability in maintaining fiscal 
discipline and instilling austerity measures in order to curtail increasing current 
expenditures”. The revenue deficit is mostly due to two reasons firstly revenue 
receipts are short off the target revenue and secondly the current expenditure is 
over and above the planned expenditure. The increased current expenditure is 
primarily due to increased expenditure on security related affairs, interest 
payments and subsidies. 
 
(b) Ensure “that within a period of ten financial year, beginning from the first July, 
2003 and ending on thirtieth June, 2013, the total public debt at the end of the 
tenth financial year does not exceed sixty percent of the estimated gross 
domestic product for that year and thereafter maintaining the total public debt 
below sixty percent of gross domestic product for any given year.” 
 
Table 2 
Debt Composition 
 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
Domestic Currency Debt 1852 1995 2152 2322 2601 3266 3852 4651 6015 
Foreign Currency Debt 1771 1816 1913 2038 2201 2778 3776 4270 4694 
Total Public Debt 3623 3810 4065 4359 4802 6044 7629 8921 10709 
GDP 4876 5641 6500 7623 8673 10243 12724 14837 18063 
Total Public Debt As % of GDP 74.3 67.6 62.5 57.2 55.4 59 60 60.1 59.3 
Source: Pakistan Debt Policy Statement 2011-12. 
 
As it is stated in the debt policy statement that “future levels of debt hinge around 
the primary balance of the government”. Mathematically, the primary balance is the fiscal 
deficit before the interest payments. Empirically there exists a long run relationship 
between fiscal deficit and debt relative to GDP. It is argued that large structural primary 
deficits and interest payments relative to GDP have had an adverse effect on growth in 
recent years. The FRDL -2005 does not consider the fiscal deficit as its objective; 
therefore, the targets of debt to GDP ratios for coming years are not seemed to be 
realistic. In other words the act should have to define targets for fiscal deficit along with 
the target for debt to GDP ratio.  
The FRDL -2005 is not effective on the provincial governments, therefore, federal 
government cannot control borrowing by the provincial governments. For effective debt 
management policy it is therefore felt that there is a need for provincial fiscal 
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responsibility legislations. The necessity of legislation is supported by the fact that the 
debt-GDP ratio is combined federal and provincial debt.  
As per above table the government seems to full fill the FRDL condition and it is 
expected that total public debt to GDP ratio will be maintained from the fiscal year 2012-
13 and own wards. 
There is a need for through investigation that how the target for 60 percent debt to 
GDP ratio has been determined.   
 
(c) Ensure “that in every financial year, beginning from the first July, 2003, and 
ending on the thirtieth June 2013, the total public debt is reduced by no less 
than two and a half percent of the estimated gross domestic product for any 
given year, provided that social and poverty alleviation related expenditures are 
not reduced below 4.5 percent of the estimated gross domestic product for any 
given year and budgetary allocation to education and health, will be doubled 
from the existing level in terms of percentage of gross domestic product during 
the next ten years.” 
The above condition has following three objectives:   
 The reduction in total public debt beginning from 01-07-2003 and ending on 30-
06-2013, the total public debt is reduced by no less than two and a half percent 
of the estimated GDP for any given year.   
 The above condition of FRDL-2005 protects the federal government expenditure on 
social and poverty related sectors. The act restricts that while reducing debt the social 
and poverty related expenditure should not be reduced below 4.5 percent of estimated 
GDP for any given year. The social and poverty related expenditure includes 
Infrastructure (highways, roads and bridges), water supply and sanitation, food 
subsidies, food support programmes, village electrification, rural development etc. 
 The budgetary allocation to education and health will be doubled from the 
existing level in terms of percentage of gross domestic product during the next 
ten years. The investment in health and education is vital for economic 
development of any country.  
 
Billion of Rupees 
Table 3 
Domestic Debt and Budgetary Allocations 
  FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
Domestic Currency Debt 1852 1995 2152 2322 2601 3266 3852 4651 6015 
Foreign Currency Debt 1771 1816 1913 2038 2201 2778 3776 4270 4694 
Total Public debt (existing) 3623 3810 4065 4359 4802 6044 7629 8921 10709 
GDP 4876 5641 6500 7623 8673 10243 12724 14837 18063 
Debt as per debt reduction strategy  3481.98 3319.48 3128.90 2912.08 2656 2337.9 1966.98 1515.4 
          
 4.5% of GDP 219.42 253.84 292.5 343.04 390.28 460.94 572.58 667.66 812.84 
Social & poverty Related expenditure 175.54 219.99 273 373.53 424.98 952.60 877.96 994.08 1246.35 
Budgetary allocation to Education as % 
of GDP 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Budgetary allocation to Health as % of 
GDP 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 
Source: Pakistan Debt Policy Statement 2011-12. 
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The three sub-conditions of clause-c are analysed in the above table.  
 The debt reduction strategy ensures continues reduction in total public debt from 
July 2003 till June 2013 and the and for each year the extent of reduction in debt 
is not less that 2.5 percent of estimated GDP for any given year. The row “debt 
as debt reduction strategy” contains the amount of debt if the strategy is fully 
followed. The total public debt for fiscal year is Rs.10709 billion whereas the 
debt should have been Rs 1515.4 Billion in case the debt strategy is fully 
implemented. There is a gap of Rs.9193.6 Billion between the existing and 
planned total public debt for 2010-11. In fact the total public debt has increased 
from Rs 3623 billion in 2002-03 to Rs.10709 billion in 2010-11. The increase in 
total public debt over the FRDL period is mainly due to persistent high level of 
fiscal deficit which for Y11 is 6.6 percent of GDP. In net shall the debt 
reduction strategy failed due to unrealistic targets/non inclusion of important 
fiscal variable (fiscal deficit) in the FRDL-2005. 
 The only positive recommendation of FRDL is that in the act expenditure on 
social and poverty alleviation has been protected up to 4.5 of GDP for any given 
year. By comparing rows 4.5 percent of GDP and social & poverty related 
expenditure it will be clear that for first three years of FRDL social & poverty 
related expenditure remained below the 4.5 percent of GDP but since Fy06 the 
expenditure has increased rather than any reduction in it and are more than the 
minimum limit set in the FRDL but these increased expenditure are at the cost 
of higher debt. In other words we have increased expenditures on social & 
poverty sector but at the same time we have also increased public debt. 
 The FRDL is silent about the expenditures incurred by the provincial 
governments on social & poverty related issues.      
 The budgetary allocation to education and health as percent of GDP was 
required to be doubled from FY03 to FY13. The budgetary allocation to 
education and Health during FY03 as % of GDP was 1.6 percent and 0.5 percent 
respectively. The FRDL is silent over the rate by which the expenditure on 
education and health would be double. In the absence of any indicated growth 
rate for increased expenditure on education and health it is difficult to check the 
compliance of FRDL on yearly basis from 2003 to 2010-11. However the above 
table indicates that expenditures on education and health have not witnessed any 
significant increase since 2002-03. 
 
(d) Not issue “new guarantees, including those for rupee lending, bonds, rates of 
return, output purchase agreements and all other claims and commitments that 
may be prescribed, from time to time, for any amount exceeding two percent of 
the estimated gross domestic product in any financial year: Provided that the 
renewal of existing guarantees shall be considered as issuing a new guarantee.” 
 This clause put restriction only on issue of new guarantees and does not speak 
about the stock of contingent liabilities which are associated with major hidden 
fiscal risk.  
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 The act in fact put restriction on contractually binding guarantees i.e. explicit 
contingent liabilities and does not put restriction on implicit contingent 
liabilities. (Economic Survey 2002-03 page-241). 
 Keeping in view the past trends of contingent liabilities one can ask the question 
that what is economic rational of including guarantees in the FRDL. The 
following table contains description of contingent liabilities: 
 
Table 4 
Contingent Liabilities 
 Contingent Liabilities Total as  Share in Total Liabilities 
Years Explicit Implicit Total % of GDP Explicit Implicit 
2002-03 16.18 84.47 100.65 2.47 16.08 83.92 
2003-04 13.18 62.69 75.87 1.35 17.38 82.62 
2004-05 15.02 79.55 94.57 1.44 15.88 84.12 
2005-06 16.17 67.86 84.03 1.10 19.24 80.76 
2006-07 35.56 88.62 124.18 1.42 28.64 71.36 
2007-08 63.05 154.17 217.21 2.07 29.02 70.98 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues).  
 
The above table indicates that neither prior to the formulation of FDRL nor after 
the imposition of FRDL the contingent liabilities pose any threat to the fiscal policy 
formulation. In fact the FRDL target only new and renewal of explicit guarantees whose 
share in total liabilities is less than 30 percent for the period 2002-03 to 2007-08. This 
small share in no way is a source of concern for the fiscal policy formulation of the 
country. 
Interestingly the FRDL overlooked the one of the important action of the 
government i.e. FRDL did not put any restriction on the federal government borrowing 
from the SBP. The government borrowing from SBP for budgetary support is steadily 
increasing over the last two decades.      
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The FRDL was implemented to improve overall fiscal discipline in the country so 
as to put the country on the desire path of economic growth. The FRDL was not frame on 
the basis of overall economic situation of the country rather it was frame on the basis of 
constitutional provision. The jurisdiction of FRDL is only the federal government and 
provincial governments are not in its jurisdiction. The FRDL put constrain only on the 
revenue deficit and ignores the fiscal deficit which is source of concern for the fiscal 
policy makers. The FRDL put numerical restriction on total public debt but these 
restrictions (targets of debt to GDP ratios) do not seems to be realistic because 
empirically there exists a long run relationship between fiscal deficit and debt relative to 
GDP. As already stated above fiscal deficit is not considered as source of concern and 
that is why no restriction/limitation is set for the growth of fiscal deficit. The only 
positive recommendation of FRDL is that in the act the expenditure on social and poverty 
alleviation has been protected up to 4.5 of GDP for any given year. Since Fy06 the 
expenditure on social & poverty alleviation has increased rather than any reduction in it 
and is more than the minimum limit set in the FRDL but these increased expenditures are 
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at the cost of higher debt. In other words we have increased expenditures on social and 
poverty sector but at the same time we have also increased public debt. The FRDL is 
silent about the expenditures incurred by the provincial governments on social and 
poverty related issues.      
The budgetary allocation to education and health as % of GDP was required to be 
doubled from FY03 to FY13. The budgetary allocation to education & Health during 
FY03 as % of GDP was 1.6 percent and 0.5 percent respectively. The FRDL is silent over 
the rate by which the expenditure on education and health would be double. In the 
absence of any indicated growth rate for increased expenditure on education and health it 
is difficult to check the compliance of FRDL on yearly basis from 2003 to 2010-11. 
However the above table indicates that expenditures on education and health have not 
witnessed any significant increase since 2002-03. 
Interestingly the FRDL overlooked the one of the important action of the 
government i.e. FRDL did not put any restriction on the federal government borrowing 
from the SBP. The government borrowing from SBP for budgetary support is steadily 
increasing over the last two decades.    
 
Recommendations 
Following recommendations are suggested to improve the quality of FRDL and to 
make it more effective. 
 The basis of FRDL should be more on economic reality of the country rather 
than on the basis of constitutional provision. 
 There is a need to put restrictions on fiscal deficit besides revenue deficit.  
 The jurisdiction of FRDL should be enhanced from federal government to all 
provincial governments. 
 The increased expenditures on social and poverty sector should not be at the cost 
of increased public debt. 
 In order to double expenditure on education and health as percentage of GDP 
from 2003 to 2013 there must be specific rates by virtue of which the 
expenditure on these two sectors would be doubled.  
 There is a need to put restrictions on federal government borrowing from SBP.  
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